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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS A RESPONSE TO
STOCK OPTION BACKDATING

INTRODUCTION
Brocade Communications Systems, Inc. recently came under investigation
for backdating employee stock options and then attempting to conceal this
practice from shareholders, regulators, and the public.1 Brocade, a company
that creates products to connect computer servers with data-storage systems,2
restated its earnings, reducing income by over $300 million to reflect that its
stock options had been accounted for improperly.3 Former chief executive
officer Gregory Reyes and Stephanie Jensen, the head of the human resources
department, were convicted of criminal charges in federal court for regularly
backdating stock options from 2000 to 2004 and concealing millions of dollars
in related expenses.4 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought
civil charges against the company and both executives individually.5 In May
2007, the company settled the SEC’s securities fraud suit by agreeing to pay a
seven million dollar penalty.6
The SEC and the United States Department of Justice are not the only ones
taking action. Many of the company’s shareholders have responded by filing

1. See Therese Poletti & Scott Duke Harris, Firms to Pay Fines on Options: Brocade,
Mercury Settle Backdating Charges with SEC, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, June 1, 2007, at A1.
2. Jordan Robertson, Ex-CEO Convicted of Options Fraud: Brocade’s Reyes Guilty on All
Counts in First Backdating Case to Go to Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at C1.
3. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock
Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1610 (2007).
4. Brocade Ex-Official Convicted, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2007, at C7; Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice and SEC, U.S. Attorney’s Office and SEC Separately Charge Former Brocade
CEO and Vice President in Stock Option Backdating Scheme (July 20, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-121.htm.
The two were accused of falsifying
company documents to cover up the backdating practice. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice
and SEC, supra. Reyes was convicted of ten felony counts in the first backdating case to reach a
jury. See Robertson, supra note 2. He was sentenced to twenty-one months in prison and ordered
to pay a $15 million fine, but his sentence has been stayed pending appeal. Pete Carey, 21
Months for Reyes, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Jan. 17, 2008, at C1. Jensen was convicted of
conspiracy and falsifying corporate records. Brocade Ex-Official Convicted, supra. She was
sentenced to four months in prison and ordered to pay a $1.25 million fine. Brocade ExEmployee Gets 4 Months in Prison, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2008, at A13.
5. See Poletti & Harris, supra note 1.
6. Id.
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derivative suits against Brocade’s directors based on allegations of a corporatewide practice of backdating stock options.7 The parties in one of the derivative
actions actually reached a settlement agreement involving significant corporate
governance changes for Brocade as well as payment of the plaintiff’s legal
fees, but the judge was critical of the terms and refused to approve the
agreement.8 Another derivative suit was recently dismissed for failing to state
a claim,9 but at least one such suit is still pending.10 Other shareholders joined
together to bring a class action suit against Brocade and its directors, asserting
violations of Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.11 The
action survived an early motion to dismiss.12
The Brocade case is not unique. Studies suggest that the practice of
backdating employee stock options in corporate America may have been
widespread.13 In the last few years, well over one hundred companies have
conducted internal inquiries, issued restatements, or come under investigation
by the SEC and the United States Department of Justice based on claims of

7. See Roth v. Reyes, No. C 06-02786 CRB, 2007 WL 2470122, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27,
2007).
8. See Julie Creswell, One Route Seems Closed, So Lawyers Try Different Lawsuit in StockOption Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006, at C4 (“You have item after item after item of
malfeasance by all these defendants—then it’s sort of a Roseannadanna situation: ‘Oh, never
mind,’ Judge Breyer told lawyers at a hearing.”). Judge Breyer’s Saturday Night Live reference
confuses Gilda Radner’s Roseanne Roseanadanna character with her Emily Litella character, who
regularly ended her Weekend Update segments with “never mind.”
9. Roth, 2007 WL 2470122, at *6–7 (explaining that plaintiffs based their theory of liability
on inapplicable provisions of the insider trading statutes).
10. Id. at *1.
11. See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 1, Smajlaj v. Brocade Commc’ns
Sys., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-02042-CRB, 2007 WL 2457534 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (citing 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008)).
12. Smajlaj v. Brocade Commc’ns Sys., Inc., No. 3:05-CV-02042-CRB, 2007 WL 2457534,
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2007) (holding that it could be reasonably inferred from the complaint’s
detailed allegations that the directors bringing the motion knew, “or were reckless in not
knowing,” that backdating was occurring).
13. Eric Dash, Study Charts Broad Manipulation of Options, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at
C2; Charles Forelle & James Bandler, The Perfect Payday, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2006, at A1;
see also Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802 (2005); David
Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J.
FIN. 449 (1997); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky CEOs (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus.,
Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 566, 2006) [hereinafter Lucky CEOs], available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=945392; Lucian Bebchuk et al., Lucky Directors (John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 573, 2006) [hereinafter Lucky
Directors], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=952239.
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stock option backdating.14 Some companies have faced civil penalties,15 and in
other cases former executives have been charged criminally.16
As the Brocade case illustrates, there are a number of avenues available for
addressing the misconduct associated with the practice of backdating stock
options. The possibilities include criminal charges, civil suits by the SEC
against companies, civil suits by the SEC against individuals within the
companies, and actions brought by the shareholders against the companies and
directors. Shareholders could bring direct suits, often in the form of class
actions, alleging that backdating constituted a securities law violation,
particularly of Rule 10b-5 which prohibits deceptive nondisclosures or
misstatements.17 Shareholders could also bring derivative suits, asserting that
by backdating directors breached their fiduciary duties.18 A main difference
between these two shareholder suits is that a derivative suit is brought by the
shareholder on behalf of the corporation, so any recovery goes to the
corporation, while damages in a direct suit are awarded directly to the
shareholders.19 Damages awarded in a 10b-5 action would equal the amount
the stock’s market value declined due to the deception.20 Since a majority of
companies’ stock was not greatly affected by revelations of backdating, direct
damages may be difficult to prove.21 This has led many shareholders to bring
derivative suits instead of direct actions in backdating cases.22
This Comment analyzes the shareholder derivative action based on
allegations of stock option backdating. It examines whether such suits will be
successful and whether a derivative action is an appropriate forum for

14. See Corporate Crime in America: Collared, ECONOMIST, Aug. 11, 2007, at 54; Perfect
Payday Options Scorecard, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Sept. 4, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/
resources/documents/info-optionsscore06-full.html.
15. See Backdated Options Cost Tech Firms Millions in Fines, CHI. TRIB., June 1, 2007, § 3,
at 5.
16. Corporate Crime in America: Collared, supra note 14.
17. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008).
18. See Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or “What’s a
Lawsuit Between Friends in an ‘Incorporated Partnership?,’” 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203,
1215–16 (1996) (explaining that in a derivative suit, “the underlying transaction or conduct . . . is
alleged to have caused some harm or breached some duty to the corporation”).
19. See id. at 1213–15; Reinier Kraakman et al., When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder
Interests?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1733, 1734 (1994).
20. Jeffrey M. Goldman, Avoiding Blurred Lines: The Computation of Damages in Rule
10b-5 Securities Class Action Lawsuits in the Ninth Circuit and a Proposal for a More Sensible
System, 2 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 261, 265 (2006).
21. See Ashby Jones, Firms Settle Backdating Suits: Some Private Cases End in
Agreements; More Deals Ahead?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2007, at A15 (“[W]ord of options
backdating typically didn’t lead to significant drops in share prices . . . .”).
22. See id. (noting that only about thirty class actions suits were filed in the wake of
backdating revelations).
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addressing corporate backdating. Part I explains stock options in general and
the process of backdating options. Part II describes shareholder derivative
actions and the obstacles the shareholder-plaintiff must overcome to bring a
successful claim. Part III examines the two Delaware cases that have laid the
framework for future decisions in shareholder derivative suits filed in response
to allegations of corporate backdating. Finally, Part IV follows with an
analysis of the somewhat conflicting results of those decisions and looks at the
future of derivative actions based on backdating claims, concluding that if a
shareholder can meet the challenge of showing the company’s directors
knowingly issued backdated options, a derivative suit is the best forum for
addressing and resolving the problem.
I. STOCK OPTIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF BACKDATING
Stock options are a form of employee compensation.23 An option allows
the holder to purchase company stock at a specified price, referred to as the
strike or exercise price.24 Many employee stock options have a vesting period,
after which employees can exercise the option.25 Exercising the option
essentially requires that the issuing company sell, at the set strike price, a
specified number of shares of its stock to the employee holding the option.26
The strike price is agreed upon when the options are issued, and it is often
equal to the current selling price of the stock, although there are other ways of
setting the price.27
When an employee exercises an option whose strike price equaled the
stock’s selling price on the date the option was issued, the employee makes a
profit if the stock’s selling price has since increased.28 The employee pays less
to buy the stock than what it is currently worth in the market. If the stock was
selling for $50/share when the option was issued, the employee may purchase
shares for $50, even if the stock is now selling for $60/share, giving the
employee a $10/share profit. It is possible that the strike price and market

23. See David I. Walker, Unpacking Backdating: Economic Analysis and Observations on
the Stock Option Scandal, 87 B.U. L. REV. 561, 567 (2007).
24. Id.
25. See Subcomm. on Executive Comp. of the Comm. on Employee Benefits and Executive
Comp., A.B.A., Executive Compensation: A 1987 Road Map for the Corporate Advisor, 43 BUS.
LAW. 185, 275 (1987) (stating that most options are subject to holding periods ranging from a few
months to several years before the options can be exercised).
26. Melissa A. Chiprich & Phillip J. Long, Empirical Study, Is Midnight Nearing for
Cinderella? Corporate America Faces Reality with Stock Option Accountability, 39 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1033, 1033–34 (2004).
27. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal Exercise Prices for Executive Stock Options,
90 AM. ECON. REV. 209, 209 (2000).
28. See Narayanan et al., supra note 3, at 1602 (explaining that if “stock price at the time of
exercise exceeds the exercise price” the difference is a payoff to the employee).
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price remain equal when the option is exercised, in which case the option
holder gains nothing. The market price might also drop below the strike price,
which makes the option worthless because it could only be exercised at a loss.
These options, where the strike price equals the fair market value of the
company’s stock on the date of issuance, are referred to as “at-the-money.”29
The common rationale for granting options of this kind is to align employee
interests with shareholder interests by giving employees personal incentives to
increase the value of the company’s stock.30
Stock options may also be issued “in-the-money.”31 This means the agreed
upon strike price is lower than the stock’s selling price on the date the option is
issued.32 If the company’s stock is currently trading for $50/share and on the
same day the strike price is set at $40/share, the option is in-the-money. The
option holder essentially has a $10/share paper profit without the stock
increasing in value.33
When a company backdates the stock options it issues, it sets the strike
price at the stock’s selling price from an earlier date.34 When backdating,
companies assign the grants prior dates where the stock price was lower than
on the date the option was actually issued, creating an in-the-money option,
because the option can be exercised at a price lower than the stock’s current
fair market value.35 Companies may legally grant in-the-money options, but

29. Walker, supra note 23, at 567.
30. John D. Shipman, Comment, The Future of Backdating Equity Options in the Wake of
SEC Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1194, 1199 (2007) (“Because
equity option grants inherently link an executive’s compensation to the value of the company’s
underlying stock, public companies generally adopt executive stock option plans to improve the
performance of management and create a proprietary interest in the company to better align
shareholder and management interests. Properly structured equity option packages provide top
executives with ‘a great incentive to raise the company’s share price, which increases both the
value of his or her options and shareholder returns.’” (footnotes omitted) (quoting TED ALLEN &
SUBODH MISHRA, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., AN INVESTOR GUIDE TO THE STOCK
OPTION TIMING SCANDAL 1 (2006))).
31. See Eric L. Johnson, Waste Not, Want Not: An Analysis of Stock Option Plans, Executive
Compensation, and the Proper Standard of Waste, 26 J. CORP. L. 145, 148 n.31 (2000) (citing
Roy F. Price, Note, Options, Waste and Agency Costs, 4 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 391, 395 n.13
(1995)).
32. Id. (explaining that this type of option would allow an employee to purchase stock below
the present market value).
33. See Mark Maremont, Authorities Probe Improper Backdating of Options: Practice
Allows Executives to Bolster Their Gains; A Highly Beneficial Pattern, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11,
2005, at A1.
34. Ashwini Jayaratnam, Recent Development, Prosecuting Stock-Option Backdating: The
Ethics of Enforcement Techniques, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 755, 755–56 (2007).
35. Stock Options Backdating: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Backdating Hearing], available at http://banking.
senate.gov/public/_files/ACFB067.pdf (testimony of Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC).
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they must record a related compensation expense.36 Unfavorable tax
consequences accompany in-the-money options, while at-the-money options
qualify for more advantageous tax treatment.37 Until recent revisions to the
rules came about, companies were not required to record any compensation
expense when at-the-money options were granted, leading companies to prefer
them over in-the-money options.38 Companies frequently adopted shareholderapproved compensation plans restricting option pricing in order to avoid the
negative tax and accounting consequences of in-the-money options.39
Problems arose when companies attempted to disguise the fact that by
backdating they were issuing in-the-money options.40 Companies tried to
make it appear as though the options were actually granted on the prior date
with the lower price. Sometimes those issuing the options would falsify
corporate records to give the appearance that the options were issued on the

36. See Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensation: Managerial Power Versus
the Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 863 (2002); see also ACCOUNTING
FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES, Opinion of the Accounting Principles Bd. No. 25, ¶ 10 (Am.
Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1972), reprinted in FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD.,
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, ORIGINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS AS OF JULY 1, 1979, at 329
(1979) (requiring that “a corporation recognize[] compensation cost for stock issued through
compensatory plans unless the employee pays an amount . . . equal to the quoted market price of
the stock at the measurement date”). FASB eventually replaced this APB opinion, and in 2004 it
issued a pronouncement requiring all companies to record the services received in exchange for
option grants. See SHARE-BASED PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No.
123R, ¶ 9–10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_
FAS123R.pdf.
37. See Walker, supra note 23, at 569 (explaining that in-the-money options do not allow the
employee to be taxed at the lower long-term capital gains rate available for at-the-money options
and that companies can only take limited deductions for in-the-money options, unlike at-themoney options, which qualify as performance-based compensation); see also I.R.C. § 421(a)(1)
(2000); id. § 162(m).
38. Walker, supra note 23, at 568–69; see id. at 570 (“Congress and the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) severely penalized the grant of in-the-money options, and
few public companies have granted such options.”).
39. See id. at 570. However, some scholars have argued that while many company option
plans require that the option’s exercise price equal the stock’s fair market value on the grant date,
they do not technically require the grant date be the same date the decision to issue the option was
made. See Lie, supra note 13, at 807; Shipman, supra note 30, at 1217. This claim ignores the
fact that companies appeared to be prohibiting grants of in-the-money options.
40. See Backdating Hearing, supra note 35 (asserting that misrepresenting the option grant
date disguises in-the-money options, giving the recipient a chance to realize larger gains, while
the company avoids reporting compensation expense); Maremont, supra note 33 (explaining that
backdating results in misleading disclosures because companies issue proxy statements claiming
the strike price equals the stock’s market value on the grant date but then use an earlier date,
where the price was lower).
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earlier date.41 Studies show the chosen backdate was often one where the
company’s stock was at its lowest selling price of the month, quarter, or even
the year.42 Concealing the date on which the option was actually granted
resulted in improper accounting and tax treatment, which led to misstated
earnings.43 It also misled shareholders about the amount of compensation
employees and executives received.44 Backdating allowed option holders to
purchase stock at a greater discount than they would have received if the
options had been priced at fair market value on the date of issuance, thereby
lowering the amount the company was paid when the options were exercised.45
In some cases backdating also amounted to a violation of the shareholderapproved compensation plan.46
In 2005, federal regulators began investigating whether companies were
engaging in the practice of backdating stock options.47 Recent academic
research had revealed a pattern of options being granted when stock prices had
reached low points, only to rise again after the grants.48 Some suggested this
indicated that executives waited to see how the market evolved before deciding
which date would be the most beneficial for issuing stock options.49 SEC
investigators initially opined that companies were timing option grants to
coincide with positive corporate news, which would have the effect of

41. For example, executives at Brocade and Comverse Technologies, Inc. were accused of
falsifying documents to hide backdating. See Judith Burns, Ex-Counsel at Comverse Settles
Lawsuit, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 2007, at A11; Steve Stecklow & Peter Waldman, Brocade ExCEO Found Guilty in Backdating Case: Criminal Trial Victory for U.S. Likely to Serve as Model
for Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Aug. 8, 2007, at A3.
42. Walker, supra note 23, at 574.
43. See Executive Compensation: Backdating to the Future, Oversight of Current Issues
Regarding Executive Compensation Including Backdating of Stock Options; Tax Treatment of
Executive Compensation, Retirement and Benefits: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance,
109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Executive Compensation Hearing], available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2005test/090606testpm.pdf (statement of Paul J.
McNulty, U.S. Deputy Att’y Gen.).
44. Id.; Walker, supra note 23, at 589–91 (stating that because the backdated options were
recorded at values much lower than they were actually worth, the amount of compensation
reported was significantly understated).
45. See Derivative Action Complaint at 9, 13, Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341 (Del. Ch.
2007) (No. 2213) (seeking recovery for the company of the difference between the exercise price
and the stock’s fair market value on the actual date of the grant). Some also argue that allowing
option holders to purchase stock discounted below fair market value on the date of the grant
dilutes share value. See Executive Compensation Hearing, supra note 43.
46. See Walker, supra note 23, at 570.
47. Maremont, supra note 33.
48. Id.; Lie, supra note 13.
49. Maremont, supra note 33 (referencing Erik Lie explaining that his study showed
“executives may have backdated options, already knowing how the market moved”).
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increasing the stock price.50 However, as more information was gathered, the
evidence suggesting the options were backdated became stronger.51 The data
indicated that the practice was utilized in numerous companies.52
The SEC’s early investigation into backdating targeted fewer than twenty
companies.53 As time passed, the number of companies suspected of
backdating greatly increased. The SEC has now investigated over 140
companies for backdating.54 Over eighty companies have restated their
financials.55 More than 160 shareholder derivative suits have been filed
against corporate directors for engaging in backdating schemes.56
II. DERIVATIVE SUITS
Shareholders are suing corporate directors for backdating stock options.57
Many have chosen to bring derivative suits because a direct suit against the
board of directors is more difficult to sustain.58 In a derivative suit, the cause
of action sought to be enforced belongs to the corporation.59 The shareholder
alleges damage to the corporation, resulting in indirect harm to himself.60 In a
backdating scenario, the plaintiff-shareholder asserts that by backdating the
stock options the defendant-directors breached their fiduciary duties to the
company.
Since a derivative suit is brought on behalf of the corporation itself, any
recovery goes to the corporation.61 Any damages the defendants owe will be
awarded to the company, but often the directors who are sued have
indemnification clauses in their employment agreements.62 This means the

50. Id.
51. See Forelle & Bandler, supra note 13.
52. See Dash, supra note 13; Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options
Widespread, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1; see also Lie, supra note 13; Lucky CEOs, supra
note 13; Lucky Directors, supra note 13; Yermack, supra note 13.
53. Forelle & Bandler, supra note 13.
54. Eric Dash & Matt Richtel, Backdating Conviction, a Big First, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8,
2007, at C2.
55. Jones, supra note 21.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.
59. Mary Elizabeth Matthews, The Shareholder Derivative Suit in Arkansas, 52 ARK. L.
REV. 353, 353 (1999).
60. Id.
61. Kraakman et al., supra note 19, at 1734.
62. See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1083
(2006) (“Almost all public companies have indemnification agreements with outside directors . . .
providing that the corporation shall advance legal expenses and indemnify legal fees, damages,
and amounts paid in settlement to the fullest extent permitted by law.”); Nishchay H. Maskay,
Comment, The Constitutionality of Federal Restrictions on the Indemnification of Attorneys’
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corporation has agreed to cover the directors’ liability, leading to the circular
result where the damages paid to the company come from the company’s funds
or its own insurance.63 However, indemnification is typically not allowed if
the directors are found liable for intentional misconduct.64 Furthermore, even
if the monetary recovery in a derivative suit is low, such suits often bring about
changes in corporate governance.65 They also serve as a deterrent for
directors, helping to prevent them from ignoring their fiduciary duties in the
future.
There are several procedural requirements for a shareholder to bring a
derivative action.66 The shareholder must first demand that the board of
directors handle the action on behalf of the corporation.67 Directors have the
authority to manage the corporation, which includes the power to decide
whether the corporation should bring a lawsuit.68 Thus, the shareholder is
expected to bring an issue to the board before taking other action so that the
directors have an opportunity to decide how to pursue the matter, if at all.69
The ideal situation is that once a shareholder makes a meritorious demand, the
board recognizes the harm to the company and acts to address it. However, the
typical board response to a shareholder’s demand is a decision not to take
action.70 If the board rejects the shareholder’s demand, the shareholder is free
to file a complaint on behalf of the corporation.71
The defendants, typically the company’s directors, will invariably file a
motion to dismiss asserting that their decision to reject the demand is protected
by the business judgment rule.72 This rule protects reasonable decisions made
Fees, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2007) (“Indemnification has become common in American
companies.”).
63. See Kraakman et al., supra note 19, at 1736, 1745–47.
64. Sandra K. Miller, The Duty of Care in the LLC: Maintaining Accountability While
Minimizing Judicial Interference, 87 NEB. L. REV. 125, 149 & n.102 (2008) (explaining that
under Delaware law an indemnification agreement may not limit a director’s liability for
intentional misconduct or other acts not in good faith).
65. See Stephen P. Ferris et al., Derivative Lawsuits as a Corporate Governance
Mechanism: Empirical Evidence on Board Changes Surrounding Filings, 42 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 143, 163 (2007) (concluding that shareholder derivative suits
“ultimately lead to beneficial adjustments in corporate governance”).
66. See Thomas P. Kinney, Comment, Stockholder Derivative Suits: Demand and Futility
Where the Board Fails to Stop Wrongdoers, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 172, 173 (1994).
67. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
68. See Tamar Frankel & Wayne M. Barsky, The Power Struggle Between Shareholders and
Directors: The Demand Requirement in Derivative Suits, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39, 48–49 (1983);
Kinney, supra note 66, at 173, 176.
69. Kinney, supra note 66, at 175–76.
70. Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 408 (2005); Kinney, supra note 66, at 176.
71. Kinney, supra note 66, at 172, 176.
72. Id. at 176.
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by informed, independent, disinterested directors from judicial scrutiny.73 “[I]t
creates ‘a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors of a
corporation acted on an informed basis [i.e., with due care], in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the
company.’”74 Essentially, the rule assumes that directors act in accordance
with their fiduciary duties. The shareholder must then show that the directors’
decision to reject demand is not protected by this rule, either because the
directors are not disinterested,75 they failed to fully inform themselves before
making the decision,76 or the decision had no rational business purpose and
could not have been in the corporation’s best interest.77 This is a high standard
for shareholders to overcome, and courts will often defer to the board’s
decision, resulting in the case being dismissed.78
Shareholders do have the option of not making a demand on the board.79
The directors would then bring a motion to dismiss for failure to make a
demand, and the shareholder would allege that demand is futile and therefore
excused.80 The shareholder must show that the board could not have made an
“unbiased business judgment” in considering the demand if it had been made.81
This will require alleging that a majority of the directors on the board were
interested in the underlying transaction, or not independent of those who were,

73. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1988).
74. Citron v. Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989) (second
alteration in original) (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)).
75. Craig W. Palm & Mark A. Kearney, A Primer on the Basics of Directors’ Duties in
Delaware: The Rules of the Game (Part 1), 40 VILL. L. REV. 1297, 1309–12 (1995) (noting that a
director has a disqualifying self-interest violating the duty of loyalty if the interest “is material or
substantial enough” to cause the director to decide differently than he would otherwise or if the
director is not independent of another director with such a self-interest).
76. Id. at 1307–08 (explaining that uninformed or misinformed decisions would violate the
directors’ duty of care).
77. See id. at 1313–15.
78. Fairfax, supra note 70, at 408; see Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993)
(“[B]ecause . . . derivative suits challenge the propriety of decisions made by directors pursuant to
their managerial authority, . . . plaintiffs must overcome the powerful presumptions of the
business judgment rule . . . .”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(declaring that boards of directors are “better-suited than courts to make business decisions”).
Courts want boards of directors to be free to make managerial decisions without fearing litigation
over the decision anytime a shareholder disagrees. See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment
Rule Revisted, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 95 (1979); Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a
Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2002) (“[The] business
judgment rule is necessary to encourage . . . directors to engage in the type of informed risk
taking that is essential to business success.”).
79. Kinney, supra note 66, at 177.
80. See id.
81. Palm & Kearney, supra note 75, at 1337–38.
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or that the transaction was not the result of valid business judgment.82 To
determine whether the board is capable of impartially reviewing a demand, the
court has to consider the board’s decision regarding the actual transaction
challenged by the shareholder’s claim, while in cases where demand was made
and rejected the court initially looks only at the board’s decision to reject the
demand and not at the underlying transaction.83 If the business judgment rule
does not protect the challenged transaction, the board cannot be deemed
impartial in considering demand and requiring it would be futile.84 To
convince the court that demand is excused, the shareholder must “plead with
particularity facts sufficient to rebut the presumptions of the business judgment
rule.”85
Even if a shareholder can overcome the business judgment rule in arguing
that demand was excused or that the board’s rejection of a demand was
wrongful, he is not free from the business judgment rule.86 The directors may
assert the business judgment rule in a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim or as a defense on the merits.87 If the shareholder successfully rebuts the
business judgment rule at trial, the directors must then satisfy the high burden
of proving the action at issue was entirely fair to the corporation and its
shareholders.88 If the directors cannot meet this burden, they are liable to the
corporation for breaching their fiduciary duties. Below are discussions of two
shareholder derivative suits brought against corporate directors for allegedly
breaching their fiduciary duties by backdating corporate stock options.

82. Id. at 1338, 1341 (noting that a challenged transaction would not be an exercise of valid
business judgment if the underlying decision involved a breach of the directors’ duties of care or
loyalty).
83. See id. at 1338–41.
84. See id. at 1337–38. To establish that the business judgment rule does not protect the
underlying transaction, the shareholder must show that the directors were not disinterested in the
transaction, the directors failed to fully inform themselves before making a decision regarding the
transaction, or the decision had no rational business purpose and could not have been in the
corporation’s best interest. See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text.
85. Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV.
353, 371 (2004); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1.
86. Palm & Kearney, supra note 75, at 1349 (“The shareholder must meet its burden of
proof and rebut the business judgment rule at each stage of the case.”).
87. See id.
88. See id.
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III. CASES SETTING THE PRECEDENT FOR DELAWARE’S BACKDATING
JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Ryan v. Gifford

In 2006, Merrill Lynch published a report on semiconductor companies
that appeared to have engaged in the practice of backdating stock options.89 A
majority of the options issued by the named companies were granted on days
where the companies’ stock prices were at their lowest points.90 One company
named in the report was Maxim Integrated Products, Inc., a designer and
manufacturer of circuits used in microprocessor equipment located in
California and incorporated in Delaware.91 The Merrill Lynch report never
actually accused Maxim of backdating, but it noted the significant
improbability of a stock having a return ten times higher than the annual
average during the twenty days following an option grant, as Maxim’s stock
did.92 The report implied that backdating was the only logical explanation.93
After the report became public, Maxim shareholder Walter Ryan filed a
derivative suit against the members of Maxim’s board of directors.94 Ryan
cited nine specific option grants between 1998 and 2002 made to John Gifford,
chairman of the board, chief executive officer, and company founder, which
were too well-timed to correspond with stock price lows to be deemed
coincidental.95 The options, which could be exercised to purchase millions of
shares of Maxim stock, were issued on dates with some of the lowest stock
prices for each particular year.96 Ryan argued that because the board of
directors allowed grants of backdated options and misled shareholders in
regards to the options, the directors violated their fiduciary duties of loyalty
and due care to the company and the shareholders.97
Backdating stock options violated Maxim’s shareholder-approved stock
option plans.98 A 1983 Stock Option Plan and a 1999 Stock Incentive Plan,
both on file with the SEC, required that each option’s exercise price be at or
above the fair market value of the stock on the date of the grant.99 This meant
the shareholder-approved plans prohibited the company from issuing in-the-

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 346–47 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Id. at 346.
See id. at 345–46.
Id. at 347.
See id.
Ryan, 918 A.2d at 345–46.
Id. at 346.
Id.
Id. at 346, 348.
See id. at 354.
Ryan, 918 A.2d at 346–48, 354.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

THE SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE SUIT AS A RESPONSE TO BACKDATING

605

money options. Ryan claimed that Maxim directors backdated stock options to
make them in-the-money, a violation of the approved option plans, and then
attempted to conceal this from the shareholders.100
This intentional disregard of the stock option plan and ensuing dishonesty
to the shareholders allegedly caused adverse tax and accounting problems for
Maxim.101 In-the-money options should have been treated as a compensation
expense, which would have reduced reported earnings.102 The fact that Maxim
attempted to conceal the in-the-money options overstated the company’s
profits, and correcting the problem would require revising the financial
statements and tax payments.103 Also, when the options were exercised,
Maxim would have received a lesser payment than if the options had not been
backdated.104
Ryan sued in Delaware, and the director-defendants responded with a
motion to dismiss the action.105 They began by arguing Ryan failed to make a
demand or to plead with particularity that demand was futile.106 The test
applied under Delaware law to determine if demand is excused as futile
depends on whether the decision at issue was made by the board of directors in
place when the suit was brought.107 Since Maxim’s shareholder-approved
option plans allowed the board to delegate all decisions regarding the issuance
of stock options to a compensation committee, the granting of the backdated
options at issue was not considered a transaction entered into by decision of the
board of directors, but rather by the compensation committee.108
In this situation, it initially appeared that the applicable test was the one
laid out in Rales v. Blasband109 for cases where the challenged decision was
not made by the current board of directors.110 Upon further consideration,
however, the Ryan court determined that this was actually a situation where the
challenged decision could be attributed to the board of directors in place when
the suit was brought.111 Although the compensation committee had been
delegated the power to administer the challenged options, at all relevant times
the committee consisted of the same three people, who were also members of

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 348, 354–55.
See id. at 348.
See id.
See id.
Ryan, 918 A.2d at 348.
Id.
Id. at 351–52.
Id. at 352.
See id. at 353.
634 A.2d 927, 933 (Del. 1993).
Ryan, 918 A.2d at 353.
See id.
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the board of directors at all relevant times.112 Since the board consisted of only
six members, half of the board approved the decision now at issue.113 The
court declared that a decision by half of the board could be “imputed to the
entire board,” making the challenged decision one by the board in place when
the suit was brought.114
This meant the test laid out in Aronson v. Lewis115 for demand futility
applied, and the important inquiry was whether the directors were disinterested
and independent or whether the decision was made in the exercise of valid
business judgment.116 If not, the directors could not be impartial, and demand
would be excused as futile.117 The shareholder bears the burden of alleging
particularized facts showing a reason to doubt the business judgment rule
applied.118 The Ryan court acknowledged that creating enough doubt to
overcome the business judgment rule and survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to plead demand futility is a difficult feat.119
In applying the Aronson test to the facts of Ryan, the court went directly to
the second prong: whether the decision to backdate was an exercise of valid
business judgment.120 Arguments could have been made in support of
excusing demand based on the first prong of the test, but this was not a clearcut case involving an obvious majority of interested directors.121 The options
at issue were all granted to Gifford,122 making him clearly interested in the
transaction because he had a direct financial benefit at stake. While three other
directors were openly involved in the transaction because they comprised the
compensation committee issuing the options, there was a question as to
whether that made them interested.123 The court passed over the matter in
favor of the seemingly stronger arguments for excusing demand based on a
lack of valid business judgment.124

112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
116. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 352–53.
117. See id. at 352.
118. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
119. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 352 n.23.
120. Id. at 354.
121. For example, in Aronson the court referenced a case where demand was excused as futile
when five of nine directors approved a stock plan likely to benefit them, making the board
interested for demand purposes. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 805, 815 (citing Bergstein v. Texas Int’l
Co., 453 A.2d 467, 471 (Del. Ch. 1982)).
122. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 348.
123. Id. at 353.
124. See id. at 354–55.
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Ryan argued that the board of directors could not undertake any action that
would contravene the shareholder-approved option plans.125 Intentionally
altering the date of the option grant by changing it to an earlier date where the
stock’s fair market value was lower, thus making the strike price lower, would
contravene the terms of the plans requiring that the exercise price be no less
than the stock’s fair market value on the date the option was granted.126 Thus,
Ryan claimed the directors’ decision to backdate violated the shareholderapproved option plans and could not be considered a valid exercise of business
judgment.127
In agreeing with Ryan’s argument, the court compared the case with
Sanders v. Wang,128 where a board of directors allegedly granted shares of
stock exceeding the number of shares authorized by the employee stock
ownership plan.129 The Sanders court held that allegations of a board acting in
violation of an approved plan raised doubt as to whether the board’s decision
was a valid exercise of business judgment.130 A knowing and intentional
decision by the board to exceed the limited authority explicitly provided by the
shareholders was enough to excuse demand as futile.131
In the Ryan case, the shareholder supported his claim that the directors had
violated the option plans by alleging that nine instances of option grants over a
long period came on the date with the lowest stock price of the month or
year.132 In addition to this suspicious timing, the Merrill Lynch report offered
empirical evidence that the grant date was manipulated to fall on an already
known low stock price date.133 Noting that Maxim’s options plans did not
designate specific times at which options would be granted, the court deemed
the actual dates chosen “too fortuitous to be mere coincidence.”134 The logical
inference was that the options were backdated in contravention of the
shareholder-approved option plan,135 making it doubtful that the decision to
backdate was an exercise of valid business judgment.136 The court found that
the shareholder’s pleadings, pointing to specific option grants, plan terms, and

125. Id. at 354.
126. Id.
127. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354.
128. No. 16640, 1999 WL 1044880 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 1999).
129. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354.
130. Sanders, 1999 WL 1044880, at *5.
131. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 354–55.
135. See id. at 355 n.34 (“[T]he Court may reasonably infer [knowing manipulation of option
grants], even when applying the heightened pleading standards.”).
136. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 355.
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supportive empirical evidence, contained sufficient particularity to excuse
demand as futile.137
After finding that demand was excused under the Aronson test, the Ryan
court declared that even if the test in Rales, for situations where the contested
decision was not made by the board of directors in place when the suit was
filed, was to be applied, demand would still be excused.138 The test inquires as
to whether there is reasonable doubt that a majority of the board of directors
would be disinterested and independent in considering the shareholder’s
demand.139 Directors cannot be deemed interested merely because they are
named in the suit,140 but directors who are sued can be deemed interested if
they face a substantial likelihood of liability.141 The Ryan court said that the
directors who approved the backdating of options faced “at the very least a
substantial likelihood of liability.”142 The court could not accept that directors
who lied to shareholders, especially about an activity that clearly violated a
shareholder-approved plan, were fulfilling their fiduciary duty of loyalty.143
Backdating was deemed one of the few instances where a transaction is “so
egregious on its face” that the board’s approval was not protected by the
business judgment rule.144 A director’s approval of the transaction was enough
to raise doubt as to his disinterestedness for purposes of considering demand
because it created a high likelihood of liability not only for a breach of
fiduciary duties, but also for other civil and criminal charges.145 Here, the
three directors comprising the compensation committee allegedly made the
decision to approve backdated options, and a fourth director, Gifford, received
the options, giving him a personal financial interest.146 Ryan’s pleading of
particular facts alleging that a majority of the six directors were interested,
either financially or in avoiding a situation of personal liability, raised enough
doubt about the board’s ability to impartially consider the demand to deem the
demand requirement futile and thus excused.147

137. Id.
138. Id. (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933–34 (Del. 1993)). The court was
essentially saying that even if a decision made by half of the board of directors could not be
imputed to the entire board (which the court found when it analyzed demand excusal under
Aronson), demand would still be excused.
139. Id.
140. This would allow shareholders to avoid the demand requirement simply by suing a
majority of the board of directors.
141. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 355.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 355–56.
145. See id. at 356 & n.38.
146. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 356.
147. See id.
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After rejecting the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to make a
demand, the court rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.148 The defendants argued that the
claim for breach of fiduciary duties failed to allege facts sufficient to rebut the
business judgment rule’s presumption that the directors acted in accordance
with their duties, and thus dismissal was required.149 The court noted that
Ryan had already pled facts raising doubt as to the validity of the business
judgment exercised in the decision at issue that were deemed sufficient under
the demand excusal’s higher pleading standard.150 Furthermore, Ryan
specifically alleged that the defendant-directors acted in bad faith, allowing his
action to survive the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim because
actions in bad faith would breach a director’s duty of loyalty.151 The Ryan
court stated that if directors intentionally defied the terms of a shareholderapproved stock option plan and then attempted to mislead the shareholders
about the options granted by making false public disclosures concerning the
grants, it would amount to conduct in bad faith.152 Thus, the shareholder pled
with particularity allegations of bad faith sufficient to rebut the business
judgment rule’s presumed protection of the directors’ decision, allowing the
claim to survive.153
The court did declare that at trial, after having time for discovery, the
shareholder would need to provide evidence to actually prove the allegations
and he could not merely rely on inferences drawn from empirical data to make
his case.154 If Ryan could prove the factual allegations he pled, the business
judgment rule would not protect the underlying transaction.155 The directors
would still be free to argue the challenged decision was entirely fair to the
company and shareholders, but that is a difficult standard to meet.156
Ryan’s derivative action thus survived the defendants’ motion to
dismiss.157 The case has since moved to the discovery stage preceding trial.
However, its result, which seemed to signal that the court was willing to hold
directors liable for participating in corporate backdating practices, appeared to
be contradicted in Desimone v. Barrows.158

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See id. at 358.
See id. at 356.
Id. at 357.
See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 357–58 (citing Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006)).
See id. at 358.
Id.
Id. at 358 n.49.
Id.
Ryan, 918 A.2d at 358 n.49.
See id. at 358.
924 A.2d 908 (Del. Ch. 2007).
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Desimone v. Barrows

The next shareholder derivative action stemming from a case of alleged
stock option backdating heard by the Delaware Chancery Court did not fare as
well for the shareholder-plaintiff. In 2006, Sycamore Networks, Inc. fell under
the scope of an investigation conducted by the SEC and the U.S. Department
of Justice for alleged backdating practices.159 A Sycamore shareholder, John
Desimone, brought a derivative action on behalf of the corporation against the
board of directors and certain recipients of the allegedly backdated grants.160
His claim relied largely on an anonymous internal memo that suggested that in
2000, option grants to six employees were backdated so the grant dates fell on
the date where the company’s stock was trading at the lowest price of the
preceding quarter.161 After this memo came to light, Sycamore’s own audit
committee conducted an internal investigation and concluded that certain stock
option grants had been accounted for improperly.162 The company restated its
earnings for the years 2000–2003.163
Sycamore, a company involved in the creation and sale of optical
networking products, had a six-member board of directors.164 Two directors
held positions within the company as chairman of the board and chief
executive officer/president.165 Neither owned Sycamore stock options.166 The
other four directors were outside directors, meaning they did not hold positions
of employment within the company.167 According to a shareholder-approved
option plan, the outside directors received compensation in the form of stock
options for their service on the board.168 Two of the outside directors also
served on the board’s compensation committee at all relevant times.169
Additionally, the company had a three-person audit committee, comprised of
different outside directors at various times.170
The challenged option grants fell into three different types: grants to rankand-file employees, grants to officers, and grants to outside directors.171 Each
of the four outside directors allegedly received backdated options.172 Five

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 912.
Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 913.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 913.
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id. at 919.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 919.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913.
Id. at 917.
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executive officers each allegedly received at least one grant of backdated
options.173 These officers, along with the six members of the board of
directors, were named as defendants in Desimone’s lawsuit.174
The backdating scheme Desimone described revolved around one
defendant, Sycamore’s former chief financial officer (CFO).175 She allegedly
instructed a former director of human resources to carry out the backdating
practice within the company.176 This director was given orders to falsify
personnel documents so they matched the altered option grant dates.177 If a
new hire received options, his start date on file would be changed to
corroborate the chosen date for the backdated options.178 After the director’s
dismissal, he presented the board with an anonymously written internal memo
describing six option grants that had been backdated to a date when
Sycamore’s stock traded at $29.125.179 Within twenty days, the stock price
had increased to $51.38.180 The options were, however, subject to a three-year
vesting period.181 The memo also included a discussion of ways to conceal
each backdated option grant, such as creating new offer letters, and assessed
the risk of audit discovery associated with each cover-up action.182
The challenged options were all issued under the authority of Sycamore’s
two shareholder-approved stock option plans.183 The Non-Employee Director
Stock Option Plan provided that the outside directors would receive
compensation in the form of 30,000 options annually.184 The plan directed that
the options would be automatically granted every year on the date of the
company’s annual stockholder meeting.185 Each option’s strike price was
required to be equal to the stock’s fair market value on the grant date.186 The
options could be exercised immediately but were subject to a vesting period

173. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 919.
174. Id. at 913, 919.
175. See id. at 919.
176. Id. at 922.
177. Id.
178. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 922.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. Therefore, while the recipient had an instant profit on the options, it was not
immediately realizable. Before the vesting period passed, the stock price actually dropped below
$10 a share, erasing any profit. Id. at 922 n.28. While some may argue that this defeats any need
for filing a derivative action, as the option holders ultimately took a loss, the actions that
allegedly occurred within the company still brought about serious concerns relating to breaches of
fiduciary duties that needed to be addressed.
182. Id. at 922–23.
183. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 919.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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between one and three years, meaning that even if an option was exercised, the
acquired stock could not be sold or borrowed against until the vesting period
passed.187
The Stock Incentive Plan authorized the option grants to company officers
and employees.188 This plan was to be administered by a committee of two or
more members of the board of directors.189 The plan allowed the board to
delegate all option-granting power to an executive officer or officers, so long
as the board set the maximum number of shares subject to grant.190 Unlike the
Non-Employee Director Plan, the Stock Incentive Plan did not require that
options be granted with an exercise price equal to the stock’s fair market value,
unless they were intended to qualify for the special tax treatment available only
to certain at-the-money options.191 While Desimone did not claim that the
challenged options issued to the officers and employees were intended to
qualify for this special treatment, he did allege that Sycamore accounted for the
options as though they were priced at the fair market value of the stock on the
date of issuance.192 He further alleged that Sycamore led shareholders, the
market, and regulatory authorities to believe that the more favorable tax and
accounting treatment for at-the-money options applied to the options issued.193
The compensation committee was to set the vesting schedule for these option
grants, and Desimone stated that the employee grants at issue were subject to a
three-year vesting period.194
In bringing his derivative action, Desimone did not make a demand upon
Sycamore’s board of directors to address the issue of backdated options.195
The defendants responded to his suit with a motion to dismiss for failure to
make a demand or to plead with particularity that demand is excused.196 The
parties agreed that the Rales test for demand excusal applied here because the
challenged decision was not made by the current board of directors.197 The

187. Id. at 919–20 (“[The] vesting schedule . . . prevented the recipients from realizing any
immediate value from the options.”).
188. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 920.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 921.
193. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 921.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 927.
196. See id. at 927–28.
197. The court does not go into detail about why the decision was not made by the board of
directors, but since the option plans delegate authority over the grants to the compensation
committee, it appears that the court is implying the committee made the challenged decisions.
See id. at 928. Since the committee here is composed of two directors and there are six directors
on the board, id. at 918–19, the committee’s decision cannot be imputed to the entire board as it
was in Ryan when half of the directors also served on the compensation committee.
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court had to determine whether the current board could have considered a
demand with independent and disinterested judgment.198 To excuse demand,
the court required particularized facts alleging either that a majority of board
members were interested or not independent from those who were or that a
majority of the board members faced a substantial threat of personal liability
for the challenged transaction, compromising their ability to make an impartial
decision about demand.199
The court first applied the test to the options granted to rank-and-file
employees.200 When Sycamore restated its financials in 2005, it admitted that
a number of options issued to employees were actually granted in-the-money
even though the company had concealed this and accounted for the options as
though they were issued at fair market value.201 However, there was no
suggestion that any of the directors had a personal interest in those grants or
were not independent of the recipients of the grants.202
Therefore, for Desimone to prove demand was excused under the Rales
test, he had to allege with particularity that the directors faced a substantial
threat of personal liability for the grants.203 The shareholder-approved plan
expressed that the board was free to delegate authority for granting options to
non-directors.204 While two directors made up the compensation committee,
the court found the logical inference was that such small option grants to
lower-level employees would have been overseen by corporate officers,
especially since the directors on the committee were the outside directors who
had no day-to-day employment within the company.205 Desimone did not
claim otherwise, making no allegation that the directors were responsible for
issuing the grants or even directing the process by which the options were
issued, which would include selecting the grant date.206 Desimone himself
referred to the former CFO, a non-director, as the “enforcer” of Sycamore’s
backdating practice.207 The particular facts pled did not indicate that the
directors shared her culpability.208 Desimone admitted he could not show that
the compensation committee was aware the employee options it approved were
backdated, and there was no requirement in the plan that the options be issued

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Desimone, 924 A.2d at 928.
Id.
See id. at 938.
Id.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 938.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 919.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 939.
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at fair market value.209 Thus, even though Sycamore admitted wrongdoing in
relation to the grants, the complaint failed to plead with particularity facts
sufficiently alleging that a majority of the directors faced a substantial
likelihood of liability for their involvement in the backdating that occurred.210
Desimone further argued that the directors’ ignorance of the fact that the
options granted to the employees were being backdated amounted to a
violation of the directors’ duty to monitor corporate compliance with the
law.211 He alleged that the internal controls Sycamore had in place were
flawed in that they had allowed the backdating practice to be carried out with
little difficulty.212 He claimed that the directors, especially the three on the
audit committee, in fulfilling their duty to monitor, should have detected,
prevented, or stopped the backdating and associated material misstatements in
the financial records.213 Desimone argued that this unsatisfactory monitoring
amounted to a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duties.214
For directors to be liable for failing to monitor corporate compliance they
must have acted in bad faith, knowingly breaching their fiduciary duties.215
The court said that for the shareholder to successfully argue that failure to
monitor served as the basis for substantial likelihood of director liability, he
would have to plead “facts suggesting that the board knew that internal
controls were inadequate, that the inadequacies could leave room for illegal or
materially harmful behavior, and that the board chose to do nothing about the
control deficiencies that it knew existed.”216 This heavy burden is why the
court in In re Caremark labeled a failure to monitor claim one of the most
difficult a plaintiff can hope to successfully establish.217
Desimone never alleged particular facts showing Sycamore’s internal
controls were inadequate.218 He made no claim that the directors, the audit
committee, or any auditors were aware of, or even suspected, any control
weaknesses.219 He also did not suggest that any of these people had
indications that backdating was occurring within the company.220 Desimone
209. Id. at 920, 939.
210. See id. at 938–39. Thus, while the options had been backdated, the pleadings did not
establish that the directors were aware of it.
211. Id. at 939.
212. Id.
213. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 939.
214. See id. at 939–40.
215. Id. at 935, 940 (noting that this type of liability was a breach of the duty of loyalty and
would require showing a “sustained or systematic failure of oversight” (quoting In re Caremark
Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996))).
216. Id. at 940.
217. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
218. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 940.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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did argue that the internal memo implied company-wide awareness of control
problems and the occurrence of backdating.221 The court, however, refused to
infer from the memo that the directors were actually aware of the
backdating.222 The memo itself only went to one employee, and it detailed the
efforts undertaken to cover up the backdating and prevent it from being
discovered in an audit.223 This did not support the claim that awareness of the
backdating was widespread within the company.224 Desimone therefore did
not plead with particularity a claim that would excuse demand on the basis that
the directors were interested, and thus not impartial in considering the
employee options.225
The Desimone court then applied the Rales test for demand excusal to the
options granted to Sycamore officers.226 Again there was no allegation that
any member of the board of directors was personally interested in the grants or
could not act independently of the recipients.227 Desimone claimed that two
sets of option grants were backdated.228 Both grants came when market prices
had dipped to low points, with increases following.229 The first challenged
grant involved the issuance of options to the former CFO and other officers,
after which Sycamore’s stock price increased by over 50% in the next twenty
days.230 The second challenged grant involved the issuance of more options to
the ex-CFO and another defendant-officer.231 These options increased only
10% over the following twenty days, but Sycamore essentially admitted that
the grant date had been backdated when it disclosed that the defendantofficer’s options had been repriced to reflect the stock’s fair market value on
the date believed to be the correct date of issuance.232
The court accepted that the compensation committee was less likely to
delegate authority over these large option grants to officers, as it would be
inappropriate for the officers to oversee grants to themselves.233 However,
Desimone did not allege that any directors were aware the option grants they
approved were backdated.234 None of the facts pled alleged that any director

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 940.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 941.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 941.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 941–42.
Id. at 942.
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was actually involved in the process of carrying out the backdating, and the
court refused to infer that the committee knew the options were backdated.235
Since the pleadings failed to allege with sufficient particularity that the
directors knowingly issued backdated options to the officers, it was not
substantially likely that a majority of the board faced personal liability
stemming from the transaction.236 Furthermore, the court said that even if it
could infer that the directors on the compensation committee knew the options
had been backdated and thus were substantially likely to be personally liable,
this would not excuse demand.237 The committee consisted of only two out of
six directors so less than half the board would be impartial in its ability to
consider demand.238 Thus, the demand requirement was not excused as
futile.239
The court then analyzed the option grants to the outside directors under the
Rales test.240 These were grants of 30,000 options to the four outside directors,
which the Non-Employee Director Plan automatically scheduled on the date of
the company’s annual meeting.241 Desimone argued that because the grants
were issued on dates where the market price was so favorable, backdating must
have occurred.242 Four out of the six directors on the board were outside
directors and therefore received the options at issue.243 Thus, a majority of the
board had a personal financial interest in the transaction.244 Furthermore, the
two other directors on the board could not be considered independent because
they relied on board approval to maintain their positions within the
company.245 Thus, under the Rales test, demand was excused as futile because
the board could not impartially consider the challenged transaction.246
After the court determined that demand was excused, it considered the
defendants’ argument that the complaint should be dismissed for failing to
state a claim.247 The court noted Desimone never alleged that the director
grants at issue were not made on the date of Sycamore’s annual meeting, as the
shareholder-approved plan required.248 Nor was there an allegation that the

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Desimone, 924 A.2d at 942.
See id.
See id. at 946.
Id.
See id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 947.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 948.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 948.
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meeting dates were manipulated to fall on days where the stock price was at a
low.249 The grant was prescheduled and non-discretionary per the plan.250 The
court held that it could not logically infer that a claim for backdating,
constituting a breach of fiduciary duties, had been made since the date of
issuance was chosen in advance and the options were actually issued on the
chosen date.251
Therefore, none of Desimone’s claims survived the motion to dismiss,
even though his case was decided after the shareholder in Ryan v. Gifford
received a favorable ruling in a derivative action stemming from a corporate
backdating situation. Following is a further analysis of shareholder derivative
suits filed in response to backdating allegations, an examination of why the
outcomes in these two cases were different, and a discussion of what
shareholders can expect in the future.
IV. A PREFERENCE FOR SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS AND THEIR
CHANCE FOR SUCCESS IN THE FUTURE
A.

A Derivative Suit Is More Attuned to the Company’s Best Interests than a
Direct Suit in a Backdating Situation

While the law technically allows companies to backdate because it allows
companies to grant in-the-money options, it requires that companies disclose
the fact that options are granted in-the-money and properly account for the
options by recording the associated compensation expense.252 However, the
actual practice of backdating appears to be a practice of avoiding disclosure.253
The benefits of backdating would be eliminated if companies were required to
disclose that it was occurring. Some scholars argue that the only problem with
backdating is the lack of disclosure.254 Yet by backdating, companies
essentially lied to shareholders, regulators, and the market in general.255 They

249. Id.
250. Id.
251. See id.
252. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
253. Companies hid the actual date of the grant (and thus the options’ in-the-money status)
and the fact that more compensation was being provided.
254. See Stephen Bainbridge, The Most Efficient Policeman, TCS DAILY, June 15, 2006,
http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=061506D (“It’s the lack of disclosure that’s the real
problem with backdated options.”); Larry Ribstein, Bainbridge and Chandler on Backdating, on
Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2007/02/bainbridge_and_.html (Feb. 8, 2007,
07:46 EST); Larry Ribstein, Criminalizing Backdating: Continued, on Ideoblog, http://busmovie.
typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/08/criminalizing_b.html (Aug. 10, 2006, 16:55 EST).
255. See Posting of Matt Bodie to PrawfsBlawg, Backdating: Yes, Virginia, Execs Do Want
Inflated Pay, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2006/09/backdating_yes_.html (Sept. 1,
2006, 11:59 EST).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

618

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:593

lied about the date the option was granted, whether it was priced at the stock’s
fair market value, the amount of compensation given, and whether tax and
accounting consequences would apply.256
Furthermore, in many instances backdating violated shareholder-approved
option compensation plans.257 Not only is the true nature of the transaction not
disclosed to the shareholders, but the action also goes beyond the scope of
authority expressly granted to the directors by the shareholders. Therefore,
many shareholders feel that directors who engage in backdating company stock
options breach their fiduciary duties.
The same circumstances that would make backdating a breach of fiduciary
duties would qualify it as a violation of Rule 10b-5. A plaintiff bringing a 10b5 claim must prove the defendant made a manipulative or deceitful material
misstatement or nondisclosure regarding the sale or purchase of securities.258
The defendant’s conduct must be intentional, and the plaintiff must establish
causation between the conduct and the harm suffered.259 The plaintiff is
required to demonstrate the amount of loss incurred, which would equal the
decline in the stock’s value attributable to the misstatement or
nondisclosure.260 With backdating, often no significant loss is apparent
because stock prices did not noticeably decrease when backdating schemes
were revealed.261 This, along with the fact that the statute of limitations for a
10b-5 claim had often run by the time the backdating was discovered,
encouraged shareholders to turn to the derivative suit.262
A derivative suit better serves the interests of the company than a
shareholder’s direct claim. If a shareholder brings a Rule 10b-5 action, the
company is forced to pay out damages. As already discussed, the majority of
shareholders did not suffer significant monetary damages in the form of lower
stock prices, so it would be better for the company, and indirectly the
shareholders, to avoid paying out any more and instead have the recovery
come back to the company. Companies within which backdating occurred face
the risk of paying penalties to the SEC and having to restate their financials.
They may incur tax liabilities. Plus, they receive lower payments when the

256. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.
258. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2008); Goldman, supra note 20, at 263.
259. Goldman, supra note 20, at 263–64.
260. Id. at 264–65.
261. Some argue this means backdating caused no harm. See, e.g., Posting of Larry Ribstein
to Harvard Law School Corporate Governance Forum, Lucky CEOs and Directors: How Serious
is the Problem?, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2006/12/22 (Dec. 22, 2006, 11:08 EST).
However, this ignores the misconduct within the company, including grants of stealth
compensation, lying to shareholders about grant dates, violations of tax and accounting rules, and
contravening shareholder-approved option plans.
262. See Jones, supra note 21.
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options were exercised than they would have if backdating had not occurred.
A shareholder derivative suit helps the company recover some of its loss.
Backdated options could be rescinded or repriced. Option recipients could be
required to disgorge profits gained from backdating. Those responsible for
backdating could even be forced to reimburse the company for any penalties it
had to pay. Changes in corporate governance should help prevent future
problems.
B.

The Future of the Derivative Suit as a Successful Method for Addressing
Backdating
1.

Distinguishing Ryan and Desimone

After the Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Ryan, it appeared that
Chancellor Chandler was paving the way for shareholder-plaintiffs to bring
derivative suits against companies based on the backdating of stock options.263
Chancellor Chandler excused demand as futile, found the business judgment
rule would not protect the directors’ decision if the allegations were true, and
allowed the case to go forward.264 Many potential shareholder-plaintiffs likely
viewed this as a victory. Ryan’s complaint against the Maxim directors was
largely based on circumstantial evidence, including statistical analysis, from
which the court was willing to infer that the directors were involved in the
backdating practice.265 The standard for demand excusal in a backdating case
did not seem out of reach, and the court said that empirical evidence would be
considered.266 Thus, it seemed that shareholders would not have too difficult
of a time reaching the discovery stage, where they hoped to find firmer
evidence of the directors’ involvement in the backdating practice.
A few months later, Vice Chancellor Strine changed directions in
Desimone.267 His opinion suggested it was not going to be easy for
shareholders to meet the pleading standard for demand excusal in a derivative

263. See Delaware Ruling Lights Way for Stock-Option Backdating Suits, Andrews Del.
Corp. Litig. Rep., Feb. 26, 2007, at 4.
264. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 355–58, 361 (Del. Ch. 2007).
265. See id. at 354–55; Posting of J. Robert Brown to The Race to the Bottom, Backdating:
Ryan v. Gifford (Continued), http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/
backdating-ryan-v-gifford-continued.html (July 10, 2007, 06:15 EST) (noting that the statistical
evidence was compelling enough to advance the case to discovery).
266. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354–55 (“In other words, it did not take much to get past a motion
to dismiss. It was enough that options were issued, that evidence of backdating existed (even if
only statistical), that the board (or relevant committee) approved the options (with a mere
assertion enough), and that there had been false disclosure.”).
267. Posting of Vaughn Marshall to The Race to the Bottom, Delaware Courts and
Backdating: A Summary, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/
delaware-courts-and-backdating-a-summary.html (July 24, 2007, 06:15 EST).
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action based on allegations of backdating.268 He rejected the complaint for
failing to plead with particularity facts establishing that the board of directors
knowingly issued or approved backdated stock options.269 Since the facts did
not specifically allege that the board knew of the backdating, the shareholder’s
claim was denied the chance to move on to the discovery stage.
On first glance, the results in Ryan and Desimone seem conflicting. The
claims were very similar, yet one survived a motion to dismiss and one did not.
Both alleged that the boards of directors were engaged in a practice of
backdating stock options. Both relied mostly on circumstantial and empirical
evidence to support their allegations. In fact, Desimone seemed to have more
evidence that backdating occurred as the company had already restated
earnings and repriced certain options after conducting an internal investigation
into the backdating practice by the time the shareholder sued.270 The
Desimone case also relied partly on an internal memo describing certain
backdating practices within the corporation.271 Yet, the Desimone case was
dismissed and the Ryan case moved forward.
There were certain key differences between the backdating claims alleged
in Ryan and Desimone that may have contributed to the different outcomes. In
Desimone, Vice Chancellor Strine refused to infer that because the grants were
made on dates with some of the lowest stock prices the directors must have
knowingly backdated the options in breach of their fiduciary duties.272 This
does not mean that backdating did not occur, but that there were not particular
factual allegations from which Vice Chancellor Strine was willing to infer that
the board was aware of the practice. Such a conclusion was bolstered by the
fact that the shareholder-approved option plans allowed oversight of option
granting to be delegated to company officers.273 This made it harder to infer
that the board had knowledge of the backdating. It was plausible that an
officer had been authorized to administer the option grants, and the board was
unaware of any impropriety.274 Vice Chancellor Strine required that the
shareholder allege with particularity that the directors knowingly backdated,

268. Posting of Vaughn Marshall to The Race to the Bottom, Desimone v. Barrows:
Backdating, Spring Loading and the Imposition of a Scienter Standard, http://www.theracetothe
bottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/2007/7/13/desimone-v-barrows-backdating-springloading-and-the-imposit.html (July 16, 2007, 06:15 EST) (noting that plaintiffs will be held to
rigorous pleading standards).
269. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 914–17, 941–43 (Del. Ch. 2007).
270. Id. at 912–13.
271. Id. at 913.
272. Id. at 938, 941–42, 948.
273. Id. at 938.
274. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 938.
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and since Desimone could not sufficiently allege “how, when, or by whom”
the grants were issued, he did not meet this standard.275
In Ryan, the shareholder-approved plans did not explicitly state that
authority over option issuances could be delegated to non-directors. The
compensation committee, comprised of half the board of directors, oversaw
option grants.276 Chancellor Chandler said the committee could be reasonably
expected to know the actual date of the grant as well as the date listed as the
issue date.277 This made it easier for Chancellor Chandler to infer that if the
allegations of backdating were true, the directors were at least aware of the
practice, if not actually engaging in it. As he said, an allegation that directors
backdated options would simultaneously allege that they acted knowingly in
doing so.278
While refusing to impute knowledge to the directors in regards to the
backdating of the employee option grants might be justified because
administration of the options was delegated to company officers, the rationale
does not apply as easily to Desimone’s officer grants. Vice Chancellor Strine
admits that administration of the large option grants to company officers would
not likely have been delegated to the officers, as it was highly improbable that
they would oversee grants to themselves.279 After admitting that the
compensation committee likely retained authority over the grants, he refused to
infer that those on the committee would have been aware that the options were
backdated.280 If neither the officers nor the compensation committee
administered the option grants, who did? Vice Chancellor Strine went on to
say that even if it could be inferred that the two directors on the compensation
committee had been aware that the options were backdated, which according to
Ryan would be sufficient to find lack of valid business judgment and personal
interest due to substantial likelihood of liability, it would make no difference
because a majority of the directors would still be impartial.281 However, in
Vice Chancellor Strine’s later analysis of the outside director grants, where he
found demand excused, he suggested that the two inside directors were not
independent of the outside directors because they relied on the outside
directors to keep them in their executive positions within the company.282 He
failed to make any mention of this lack of independence when he declared that

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Id. at 942.
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 353 (Del. Ch. 2007).
Id. at 355 n.35.
Id.
Desimone, 924 A.2d at 941–42.
Id. at 942.
See id.
Id. at 947.
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even if the compensation committee were deemed interested, the majority of
the board remained impartial.
Another distinguishing factor between Desimone and Ryan stressed by
Vice Chancellor Strine was the fact that the Stock Incentive Plan in Desimone,
authorizing option grants to officers and employees, did not require that the
options be issued with an exercise price equal to the stock’s fair market value
on the date of issuance.283 This meant that the company could backdate and
issue in-the-money options without contravening a shareholder-approved plan.
It may be that the lack of such a requirement in the shareholder-approved
option plan is why Vice Chancellor Strine would not infer that the
compensation committee knowingly approved backdated options. Since it was
not a violation of the plan to issue options below fair market value, there was a
possibility that the board was innocently approving backdated grants. In Ryan,
however, the shareholder-approved plan clearly required that all options be
granted at the stock’s fair market value.284 Chancellor Chandler emphasized
the fact that by backdating the directors acted in violation of their shareholdergranted power.285 In finding that demand was excused because the board’s
decision was not an exercise of valid business judgment, it was key that the
board had decided to disregard the shareholder-approved option plan.
Without a clause in a shareholder-approved plan requiring options be
issued at fair market value, a decision by the board to engage in backdating
cannot likely be deemed so egregious on its face that it could not be the
exercise of valid business judgment. When there is no explicit limitation on
directors to prevent them from granting in-the-money options, the decision to
backdate is not as clearly suspect. However, even if directors are not violating
a shareholder-approved plan when they backdate, they still lie to the
shareholders, authorities, and market when they conceal it. Directors failing to
properly disclose and account for options, and instead trying to pass them off
as at-the-money options by issuing fraudulent paperwork to that effect, still
commit a falsehood that should amount to a breach of the duty of loyalty. In
Ryan, Chancellor Chandler even acknowledged that it was hard to imagine a
scenario where a director could lie to his shareholders and still fulfill the duty
of loyalty.286
A final distinguishing feature between Desimone and Ryan was that the
Desimone grants to the outside directors were set to occur automatically on a
predetermined date. In Ryan all of the challenged grants were discretionary,
and evidence showed that over a period of years the grants consistently fell on

283.
284.
285.
286.

Id. at 920.
Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 354 (Del. Ch. 2007).
See id. at 355.
Id.
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dates where the stock price was unusually low.287 In Desimone, the challenged
grants to the outside directors came on the date of the annual stockholder
meeting, chosen in advance.288 There was no allegation that the meeting date
was manipulated.289 Only grants from two years over a multi-year period were
challenged, suggesting that in the other years the grants had not come on dates
quite as beneficial for the recipient-directors.290 This is consistent with the
purpose of a nondiscretionary, prescheduled option issuance plan. There will
be good dates and bad dates, and the recipient shares in the gains and the
losses.
2.

Where the Delaware Courts Are Headed

Although Vice Chancellor Strine’s change of course in Desimone leaned
toward dismissing shareholder derivative suits based on allegations of
backdating by requiring somewhat rigorous pleading standards,291 the
Delaware Chancery Court’s future approach might not be quite as antishareholder as that case hinted.292 In Conrad v. Blank, decided post-Desimone,
Vice Chancellor Lamb employed a more Ryan-like approach in accepting the
shareholder’s circumstantial evidence, including statistical analysis, alleging
that the directors affirmatively backdated options or wrongly approved their

287. Id. at 354.
288. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 948.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 917.
291. Some scholars have even claimed that Vice-Chancellor Strine’s opinion did everything
possible to validate backdating as merely another form of compensation. Posting of J. Robert
Brown to The Race to the Bottom, Backdating, the Delaware Courts, and a Guest Appearance of
Common Sense: Conrad v. Blank, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delawarelaw/backdating-the-delaware-courts-and-a-guest-appearance-of-com.html (Oct. 29, 2007, 06:46
EST).
292. In a backdating case following Desimone, Vice-Chancellor Lamb declared that he was
declining to follow certain cases decided in California federal courts applying Delaware law in
that they imposed a “harsher standard than is applied in Ryan.” Conrad v. Blank, 940 A.2d 28, 38
n.22 (Del. Ch. 2007). While the California federal district courts have continued acting
somewhat unfavorably to shareholders bringing derivative claims based on allegations of
backdating, see, e.g., In re CNET Networks, Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., No. C 06-03817
WHA, 2008 WL 2445200 (N.D. Cal. June 16, 2008) (dismissing the derivative complaint for
failure to allege demand futility with sufficient particularity), the Delaware Chancery Court has
recently indicated a willingness to open the door for the shareholders’ backdating derivative suits
by declaring that evidence of stock option backdating amounts to a “credible basis” from which
possible corporate misconduct can be inferred, justifying a grant of access to corporate books and
records under a Section 220 action to assist the shareholders in drafting derivative pleadings, see
La. Mun. Police Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. Civ.A. 2608-VCN, 2007
WL 2896540, at *15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2007); Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912,
920 (Del. Ch. 2007) (granting the CNET shareholder access to corporate books and records in the
derivative action that was later dismissed by the California federal district court).
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issuance.293 Although the directors argued the complaint failed to plead with
particularity that the directors knowingly backdated, the court relied on Ryan
to find it could be reasonably inferred that directors on the compensation
committee acted knowingly in granting backdated options because they would
be expected to know the date listed on the option as well as the date they
approved the grant.294 The court excused demand as futile, allowing the case
to proceed to discovery.295
The cases show there are certain factors that, if present, will make the
chances of success on a shareholder derivative action based on allegations of
backdating much stronger. Being able to allege the directors acted in violation
of a shareholder-approved option plan will vastly strengthen a claim that
demand is excused as futile because the directors either did not exercise valid
business judgment when they disregarded the plan or put themselves in
positions of substantial personal liability by violating the plan. Showing a
pattern of grants falling on dates where the stock is at a very low point, as
opposed to only a few isolated instances, is beneficial. The courts have been
quite receptive to statistical evidence in support of backdating claims. Any
restatement of earnings or other disclosure by the company that the options
were improperly accounted for would be favorable.
Other factors are less favorable. A clause in the option plan allowing the
directors to delegate authority over option granting to someone else within the
corporation will be problematic. Also, if the option grants were prescheduled,
the chances that the court will find misconduct occurred are greatly reduced.
A shareholder should closely consider the individual circumstances of a case
before deciding whether it is worth pursuing. Courts will not be sympathetic
to claims rushed forward at the first mention that backdating may have

293. Conrad, 940 A.2d at 35. This was a shareholder derivative action against Staples, Inc.
See id. at 34. The shareholder alleged that the directors knowingly backdated at least twelve
specific option grants over a ten-year period in violation of a shareholder-approved option plan
requiring the grants to be priced at the stock’s fair market value. Id. at 31, 33. In support of this,
the shareholder relied on the fact that most grants came on dates where the stock price was at the
low for the quarter or month, as well as statistical data showing the high return on the options
compared to the average annual rate. Id. at 34–35. The company had also issued a report that
certain options were accounted for with incorrect measurement dates, although it denied
intentional wrongdoing. Id. at 33–34. The court applied the Rales test for demand excusal
because the parties agreed that the compensation committee, comprised of three of the company’s
ten directors, issued the options, not the board itself. Id. at 36–37. Two other directors were
recipients of the challenged options. Id. at 38. Thus, the court concluded that half of the board
was interested in the transaction, either financially or by facing a substantial risk of personal
liability, and therefore could not impartially consider demand. Id. at 40.
294. Id. at 40.
295. Id.
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occurred, with the shareholder failing to make pre-suit demand or to present
through the pleadings allegations showing that demand is excused.296
If demand is excused, the shareholder will have to gather more concrete
evidence that the directors knowingly backdated company stock options to
survive the case on the merits. Statistical analysis and financial restatements
will likely not be enough.297 Surviving the motion to dismiss gets the
shareholder to the discovery stage, where he may be able to uncover the
necessary evidence. At this stage, the defendants may be more willing to settle
rather than go through the long and expensive discovery and trial process. In
settlement discussions, or even after a successful trial on the merits, the
shareholder is in a good position to repair some of the harm that backdating
may have caused to the company.
In cases where the directors’ awareness of the backdating can be shown,
the derivative suit proves to be an advantageous forum for addressing the
matter. It provides a means of punishing misconduct and regulating the
relationship between the company and its agents, the directors. Since the
major problems with backdating are the lack of disclosure and lying to the
shareholders, the preferred means of addressing the problems should involve
the parties within the company. There needs to be some check on those with
the power to act for the company, and the derivative suit gives shareholders a
way to address improper conduct by those in charge. The derivative suit
allows the company to recover some of the loss it may have incurred by
directors’ misconduct. It also provides an important way to achieve changes in
While new accounting rules may have
the company’s practices.298
significantly decreased the likelihood of backdating in the future, the fact that
it occurred shows there were people within the company who believed it was
acceptable, and there were insufficient controls to stop it.299 The changes in
corporate governance and deterrence of future misconduct that the derivative

296. See, e.g., Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 951 (2007) (deriding the shareholder for
filing suit without seeking access to corporate books or records and before the directors’
investigation was complete).
297. At trial, after having the benefit of discovery, the plaintiff has the burden to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the business judgment rule does not protect the transaction
because the defendants breached their fiduciary duties by backdating. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918
A.2d 341, 358 n.49 (Del. Ch. 2007). However, in the most egregious cases, where there is little
doubt that the directors were involved in backdating, this evidence may be sufficient. Id. at 358.
298. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
299. See The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 403, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (2006) (requiring
option grants be reported to the SEC within two business days after issuance); SHARE-BASED
PAYMENT, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123R (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2004), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/aop_FAS123R.pdf (requiring that companies record
a compensation expense for both in-the-money and at-the-money options).
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suit provides make it a preferable choice over other means of regulatory
enforcement.300
Companies should prefer a derivative suit over the alternative forums for
addressing the problem. The final results in a derivative suit are more
satisfactory than paying large civil fines or damages to shareholders in direct
suits. Many have also suggested that there has been an over-criminalization of
corporate law and that backdating should not amount to a criminal violation.301
The shareholder derivative action provides a means for punishing the
misconduct without criminalizing it. The problem is that the SEC and Justice
Department are not asking which forum the company would prefer, so if there
were instances of backdating, chances are the company could have to address
them in all forums. If, however, companies were allowed to choose a forum
for regulating the problems of backdating, the shareholder derivative suit
should be at the top of the list. It is the one option that focuses only on
restoring some of the company’s loss or correcting its problems, instead of
increasing its loss.302
CONCLUSION
As the cases here demonstrate, each backdating scenario is unique. Not all
backdating cases can be linked together, and not all of them should have the
same result. Each instance of backdating will not necessarily translate into a
successful shareholder derivative suit because if the directors were unaware of
the backdating, then it is doubtful that shareholders could succeed on a claim
for breach of fiduciary duties. As Vice Chancellor Strine explained, “a
cautious, non-generic approach to addressing the various options practices now
under challenge in many lawsuits” is necessary.303 However, as this analysis
suggests, when certain key factors are present and the shareholder is able to

300. While there may be little need for deterring backdating in the future, the derivative suit
can still help deter directors from failing to make disclosures, or essentially lying, to shareholders
about corporate practices in the future.
301. See Dick Thornburgh, Keynote Luncheon Address at the Georgetown University Law
Center Conference on Corporate Criminality: Legal, Ethical, and Managerial Implications: The
Dangers of Over-Criminalization and the Need for Real Reform: The Dilemma of Artificial
Entities and Artificial Crimes (March 15, 2007), in 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1279 (2007)
(criticizing Congress for abusing “its power in creating more criminal statutes involving nontraditional criminal conduct”); Larry E. Ribstein, Criminalizing Backdating, on Ideoblog,
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/07/criminalizing_b.html (Jul. 21, 2006, 07:30 EST)
(“[C]riminalizing this business practice [of backdating] is not the answer.”).
302. SEC charges and Rule 10b-5 actions will likely result in the corporation paying penalties
or damages. Criminal charges against individuals may decrease a company’s ability to attract
qualified management and do nothing to address the internal management problems the company
experienced.
303. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 931 (2007).
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show the directors were involved in backdating, addressing the matter through
a shareholder derivative suit is the preferable option.
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